THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES by de Gorter, Harry & Fisher, Eric O'N.
The Dynamic Effects of

















- ......Department of Agricultural Economicsj
NevJ YorkState CoHege of Agriculture and Ufe Sciences
A Statutory College ofthe State University
lSornell University, Ithaca, New York, 14853-7801it is the policy of Com~i; Unh"erslfy C1dive!y to support equoHty
of edv.:at!ono! end employment oppOrh.H1ity. No perwn §hall be
detlted ~dmisi;oo to any edlJc{lHonol program or activity or be
denied ~mployment ~n trt2 bosis of any !f!>ga!!y pwhlbiteci dis~
crimination invo-iving, Ot!f not Hmitea to, such fadon; as race,
color; <.reed, f~ngion} noHo-o~l or eHmk odgin, se;(, age or
handkap. The University h committed to the maint~nonce of
affirmat;ve action prcgroms w~kh wi!! aS$un~ tho(;; cOtHirwaHon







































This paper analyzes the dynamic effects of the acreage restrictions and land
diversion requirements that are characteristic of the farm subsidy programs
in the United States. The subsidy payments a farmer receive,s ar-e based upon
hist-Gt'ical base acreage, and it 1s sOlnetime~ optimal for a farmer not to
partlclpat~ in a pr9gr~m in ,order to increase base acreage In anticIpation of
higher future sub$ldies. This paper dele:r_lnes the far-mer· s optimal policy
as tbe solution to' 'a 'd~-termt:nlstlc' dynami'c 'program. It shows that farmers
with low base acreage typically opt out o:f' these p:tt);grams. whereas those with
high base acre'ag:e participate 1n them. The paper concludes with an
examination of aggr-egate data from the programs involving barley, cornt
cotton, oats, rice, sorghum t and wheat during 1987. It shows that these
programs actually increase the aggregate output of each of these crops and




fie ~~$ $ J9~~~l~rnbed, farmer. ~,<> God f~~rJf;1gL fr:~~,qQm-loving.
laiJ....ahidfiig rugged "lridi,/idu:a'list 'who held that' 'fed~ral<>'afd"to anyone
but f~im:ers was ~:re:~p~ng, S;;:QcJ:~l1.~m. His ~p:e:C'i-al~:y \ola's ,al,f'alfa.
and 'h~ 'made a ,g,oo~' ':tlhTh:g: or ,~ht :growing any. The 'gover,nmeri:t pal:ii him
well for,every bushel of ,alfiHfa be 41d "rU?Jt grow. Th~' moq~ alf.a1fa, he
di'~" P6t gtow:' th~, mo,t6 money - the ,gbve:rnment 'gave hi'm, a:~d he spe-nl
eV,e,ry penny; h~ d-idn~ t _earn on, new .land to ~,ncrea$e the amoupt of
aifalf~ he dld not produce. He invested in hind wisely and 'soon
was not grO\oiing mO,re alfalfa than any otJ:1er man in the country. . ..
,IH]e was an outsp,qken champion of economy in government. provid~d
it did not interfere with tpe sacred duty of government to pay farmers
a~ mucQ,as they could get for all the alfalfa they produced that no one
else w~h£ed 6i for not producing any alfalfa at all.
(Joseph Heller. Catch 22~ pp. 82-83)
I. Introductio-n
The analysis of acreage restriction programs is one of the staples of an
introduct.ory course in economics, For example. Samuelson and Nord.:haus (13th
Edition, 1989. p. 433)' explain:
~ .. {IIn the 19,aOs the Treasury simply mailed a sub~$l,dy payment
to farmers for every bushel of wheat or corn harvested.
1 The authors would like to thank L~rry Blume for several very helpful
discussions. They would also like to thank Henry Wan, Panagiotis Mavros,
David Nielson. and seminar participants at Cornell University for their
comments. Any errors remaining in the manuscript are solely the authors'
responsibility.
1, " -, ",One,,of,,>the,'mo:s:t, <"cp;mmQ:n,,»go\f.~:r:ntnen t {ar.fJt, P>r:9g-t:a1J!:~"r:eq\ill r~.s_,!.ar,meT.,s '
to restrict pJ:an:t~q acr~~ge.' >-- If t~e ~p~rt:rnent (If Ag:rlctelltute
req:u-lre~ ~ver:y :f~t_mer >'t:~ '}ls'e,t_, :as;i~,tt, ~Q,;'~:P¢:f:~~~t< ,,6-f:,,_,tq~ ,l-a:?~,.Y~~f· ~-"
p:fanh~d : ~r~~:';;;qf>':'pcit~p::;:>t~l,s-:-:~iis::::-l~e" :~ff~:ht ;:~t ~hrft~~p:g""t)l~""'~uppty'"
curve of corn to the left. Becaus-e the demands tor 'corn and most
other agrlc1J~tural pr,oduclS are :i:~elas-tlc, -such cro:p'restrIctl()'l:ls not
only ralse the pr-1.ce of CQ;rn and' other produets,; tn~y also t~~nd to
raise the' total revenues ea,pned;'-b~<f~.rMerSand totai fa,t:JIl Incomes.
This 1s a typical representatl~'~.:,?,r f~r.~ ,.pol;lcy in the Un!ted St~tes~ 1t
emphasizes the effect of acreage restrictions in decreasing the supply of
crops. However t these acreage re'strlctlon pro~'rams ate voluntary, and' hence
::,.~~~:l~=:~:n ••::;:;::;t ·~::1;;~'·~h.:~,t,·h~~:S:::~ ~:~:ig:#~~:f;r~t::
>> " > ~ A ~ ~ ••
v v ~ > ~
~~?an~:' -'~:~f·t~,~~:'-£~f:~:ag~,: ,i:~' :~-n~\~.ij~i~\t~#;,: ,~~,:':':rUlur~', &Qb~~:d:ie$. ''Samu~1sOh ,and
No}~:n~~us ':;reCQ~~lze ' ~~i:$ clynaritiC',';asp~:q:t-:ot the' >c:r~p" ,r'estrittto!!'pr'6:gram:s,;' they
explain in the' paragraph 'above 'that' this year' ss-~bs'ldles< are ba~ed in part
upon ,l:a:st y~~r)s p~~ti;~ing. rl {~, tle~r, :then,. ,~Fk~:t .a <f6r'w~t9:~~,~bki~:g farmer
may 'pla'nta- :l~}'ge'acreage .l-t} ~n:ticip:a,~.ibn: 0(' ne~l»yea.t"s s':i;bsid~:e:s. One can
,c0n~ider this ?~t i vi t Y r,~mt -.seeki Q:& .behavtor on 'the 'part of a
effect of these programs is on aggregate market supply.
incepti:yes tne~e programs offer. It ',i.s impo-rta-nt 'to tmder,stand the net
controversial political issue in this decade. Ind~eed.t agrl:cultural policy i~,_
a central topic in the current Uruguay round of -negotiations under the
Genet-at 'Agreemeh,t -on Tariffs a:ncf -Tra4e:~" ":Furth'er, Hie 'costs 61 these subsidy
programs have risen dramatIcally durlng a period when the felde-ral
government's budget deficit has been an issue of press-ing p,ublic concern. We
develop a dynamic model of the eff'ec-ts of a~reage restrictions pretieely in
order- to determine the net effect of these programs -Oh th~, outputs of the
2_, ,A,-key ,{e,atute_/of these, fa;tm pol1cl.es 15 that a participant in a program
program ts -limited __1n her pl~nt:1ng by her ba$e- acre:age. a fixed proportion of
whlch-.m:us-t'-b~ dive~ted':1n -or:der- -to ·q·uallfy;',for, subsidies. The cl1rr_~.nt policY
1n :~the, Un1ted'.,-States dete.t'mines, :hls-tor1caL base· ac-re:age for an. lndlvidual
far'mer ':a-c;ccrdJ-ng' it:>':a f 1.ve....ye~~ mo,vlng ~verage :9f, -her ~t:con$:1d~r:ed pi·ant ~:p.gs 1;1?
,?f..the-- '$ub~j,dize(;bcrop..::, ..:F.a:t:11ler:~,: _~f,t:en, ,f:-in~,l.t i.n, t:helr-. long~:r-W1. interest.t9
" . _ - -. - - 3
O-pt, cQul -~:€tml?ot'a.ri};Y' f:VQtn the :.p,r:Q~r~rn,-and: 'In:cr:~~se ~~rr:eJi:t -p,lant,ing.. - ,'. Th:i?
raise,s h~¥-~h,_ba$e ac:r:e'ag~ :!:loq ,:' S\l~sJdy 'p:~ymept s in t.he ,l);ltur,e. .,- -JI,ence-. any
dynamic :,analy-sis of th-e:se :':p.r,O,gi:'~'~s must add:r_ess the e;xtent to -which _farmer!?
are willing to forego current-subsidy payments. inCUF'extra production costs l
and increase current planting in order to increase future subsidy ,payments.
The official jargon for these programs is ttb-ase acreage li.mitations
H and
',' lIacreage dive:rsionl~. The Treasury sends two diffe.r~nt checks to participants
output and: a predetermined, target pr ice~ and the other covers the land t:hat
the farmer is r-eq.uired .to divert.. These ate called t'deficiency payments
U -an~
Udiversion payments" respectively. The deficiency p9.yment is a per unit
subsidy that is ~the dif.ference between -a target pri-ee and the maximum of the
market price and a Hloan rate".4 It 1s calculated as the product of this
2 CQns !,d~r~4 PAa~.tlng$ are_.t~e ,.;?UJn f>f ~~tua.l, pl~nt lng and, _acres dlv~rted
und~'r the' requir~tnents of a subsidy ptogram.
3 See Ericksen and Collins (1985).
4 This is an official predetermined selling price that the federal government
guarantees for any farmer in the program. The government maintains the loan
rate by stockpi1tng farm output. The cost of this policy is borne by the
Commodity Credit Corporation, and it is independent of the deficiency and
diversion payment schemes.
3pt-lo'e" 'different lal~'','an',' uor,fft'ftil!' .'1~~N~1 '>"0£" j)t~odti-c:tl(jnj ,S:" <and ';::the' ::to:t:a.}::=ritillihe:r
of acres planted.. The :d;!:ve:r:sf,on paynren'i: ;15 a' p,~r ,'unlt: pay:i'nenl"Ol1< :land' r:l6:f
planted. Furtherf for, ,each subsld:lzea..crop, there',ls.,a .maxi·mum, on the' total
TcY the best of our· knt>:\41edge, there 'has, been .no :dyhamlc' :analysls: of
these· pr'd:gr-ams in the ll:terature;
typically analyzed "using 'comparative.statlcs. ,Yal1ace," 'Ct962;}' and Gardner
Garq:ner .'(:,l:981,) 'altlO .·U$~~...this t.e,chfilque,:i:i;l. :ht~,: ·1:nflt;le.~tl:~1-.· ~,e:)C~" :." :Llcl1:t.~!1b~.r:g
attEf ~.>flber1llan, :.t·P~~:Q;:). ::gi '{~:. a" ,.,!;'t.ati'c' analys:l's ':'r>:{' th~: ~~~~tar~.' '#1'.[ee .t,~ ,'of
> ~ ~ ~ ~ >
far-fIrer's de'cision problem, but he analyzes the· planting deci-sions of Egyptian
cottb:h producers.
-Our· own 'work ·lncorporat.es 'six "a,lements,' that' are· not found.,un:if.or:mly in
the· :Iiterature on .·agricul.tutal 8ubsia.ies:.
endogenous declsion' of the farme:F. Second. w:e, deal exphiclt.ly with the fact
·that tarttr' acreage mUS',t be·,diverted tnto unpr-dductive uses in order for" a
farmer to receive de:ficiency payments. Third', \!{e U$e the fact that subsjdi~es
to a farmer are lim!ted by her 'historical base acr:eage. fou:rth. ~e .treat· the
dIfference between the actt:ral yield that a farmer realizes on her land and
the official program yield that the federal government uses to determine
subsidy payments. Fifth. we model the diversion payments tha't a farmer
5 This "official" level of production is a predetermined yield per acre; this
is called Itprogram' yield". This yield is set by the federal government, and
it is public knowledge.
4payments' and a1 ~erslori payment:s -1s 'curr-ently 11m!ted 10 $50,00'0 per farm.
The rest of the paper 1s structured as- fol-lows. Section I I se,ts out the
model and show'S that there 1s an optimal policy for the farmer. In Section
III. we analyze a simple example to illustrate the nature of the optimal
pollcy. Section IV presents simulated solutions to the dynamic program for
the seven major field crops in 1981, the only year- for which complete data on
the distribution of farm base acreages are available. Section V presents our
conclusIons, and our data and sources are described tn the Data Appendix.
II. 11le Model
Let us consider the long-run decis-ions of a farmer operating under the
current acre'age' iestriction policy in the United States. Because we are:
interested in the decisions of an individual fa:rmer, we shall study a model
of price taking behavior. It is important to emphasize that we assume that
the farmer has perfect foresight. This will enable us to model the farmer's
decisioh as a deterministic dynamic program. The assumption of perfect
foresight is in part justified by the -f,act that the target price, the loan
rate, 'the program yield, the diversion fa,ctor, the dIversion payments, and
the maximal subsidy payment available to a farmer are all known before the
time of planting. Moreover, almost all of these parameters have not changed
dramatically during this decade. As we shall see below, market price and a
farmer's actual yield do influence the per period reward, but we assume that
farmers outside the program can take covered posttlons by using forward
contracts in order to insure against adverse price movements. Further, we
assume that all farmers of a given crop ~re identical a-nd that each farmer's
5We',beg,in by defining' t}l~>ne,t,proflt"funGtipn'9f>-a ,farm fa~lng.a price P"
OJ
to' ,prod-uc;e q 'units' of'output.
The cast' l-unct-ion '-c(q)- is, ,po-slt-ive, noo-decreasing, and
continuous on ~++' Fupther, liM" ·c{q) ~ 0, and c(O) = O. q'VO
The ,analysi's,: can> ,be this ,ge:neFal b~Qause the existence of a dynQ.mic program
is.,robustw,ith "re>spect ,.to. many <~:p;~~Jfieat,i9QS "of th~, co-st,,ftg1ct ~on.« We .can
e~en:'a:<l,lbW':for: tp;e p~sn3:ibil:lty ·of,·no:fixea ',costs _'~f one places :a:I) upper "bclund
> ~ ~ ., ~~ ~ > ~ y
on the amount· of acreage that any farmer may plant.
sJm:ulate the $olutions to,,' the q;ynarnic pr,ogram -using an aEbitrary
sp:Ee,cification of ceq) as a .third >,degr~e polynomial.
,If ·a farmer. is a :p-art·icl,pant, -In. a subsidy pF~gr:am and pIa,nts sufficient
land to yield qt busheLs., ,the deficiency payments she receives are ,givE:n by,
6 We re'co.gnize frankly that both' land and' farmers come in 'different 'quaIltres
and that each farmer
t s output is stochastic. Since we are not 1imiting
ourselves to quadratic cost functions, the effect of incorporating
uncertainty about yield into the farmer1s dynamic optimization would
complicate the analysis considerably. Including individual farm
characteristics would create analogous difficulties. Further. in the
empirical work in Section IV, we cannot hope to analyze individual yield per
farmer with aggregate data.
6where T is the target price, P Is the market price, PY Is the program yield,
AY is' the' actual yield" 'and L 1s the' loan rate. We-shall assume, of cours'e.
that "t' > max {P; "Ll. The farmer's revenues can be defined 'as
This, expreSSit>h >sho;~s that'" sh~' sell'S
her autput at the maximum of> tnarket price and the 10an rate and that her
deficlen:cy <payments can actuallY,16e increased by 'a higher pr.ogram yi~ld.
We must add the further consideration that a participant is often paid
for the acres that she is forced t9 divert in order to be in the subsidy
program. Farmers receive a per ,unit payment '1 for every unit' s worth of
land that t.hey leave 7 fallow. Let the farmer's base acreage be given
equivalent to xt units of output. Now let qt :s xt . Then the tota:l revenues
accruing to a participant in, the ,program are
g(Xt~ qt; T, P, L, PY, AY, 7) =
(T - max {P, L}] [PY/AY] [qt] + [max {P, L}] [qt] + 1 [PY/AY] [Xt - qt]
where we have defined the function g(xt , qt; 'L with the variables and
parameters defined as above. We can now define
7 It is more accur~te to model diversion payments as a non-linear function of
the number of acres diverted. There is typically a minimum number of acres
that must be diverted for which there Is no diversion payment. Then there is
an increasing payment per ad:iitional incremental acres that are diverted by a
participant in the program. We do not have data 'on these non-linearities, and
leaving them out of the model does not affect our results in any substantive
way. Indeed, these diversion payments were identically zero in 1987 for
three of the crops we study.
7(2)
wpe:r~ h ~->;t J :' 9.tJ-; denQ-t~~p ,~et Jeyeng:~:$ a. ,:~ar:tlc:lp9J,:lng - (,.f;ttI~r ' re<ceJY~~ -fr~m
having base acre~~~, ~qulvalent: tp ~Xt ~lt<s,:and, pla,n:~lI;l8 ac~eage t9 .y1e~d '0111y
qt un!ts.
As we mentioned aboy-e, there is~a-m?x~mal sUbsi~y,~der<the p~ogram; let
us denote ·the planted 'output equtvalent of this maxImum 'by M.,$ this
Sfnce' this expression is linear iil qt' it will attain its ma'xim-um at 0 or x
t
'
Ind:eed,~ if [T ','-' -max {Po -L} ... -.rl 'a 0" then,'it 'attains';its 'ma,xi'murn at x
t
;' and,M
=S0000',[AY1Py-rr+ - lRax{P. L}}-\ If [T: ... max {F. L} - >r] ,'< 0 and '3' > 0, then
M ::::; ',5:0000 [AY!'PY] '4-1.
"We ~r,~ now in a positi'Ofl t0~'define the' farme,r"s "prol;Slem. Stnde x -is t
the farmer's historical base acreage, we can consider it the state variable










8 Farmers ,have been quite ing,enious in circumventing this maximum. For
examp:le, they have subdivi.ded farms, into several cor,po.~atiQ1).~.< «Jt has t{e,e:n
particularly easy to give such a corporation to one'-s; chi19. thus k.eeping the
l:;>enefits of fe~eral subsidies ~,n tn_e fami'ly. They have also I'eased land on
their farms to employ.e.es. charging rents high enough to capture a substantial
part of the i.mplict't gov.ernment benefits. Sumner (19,89) gives'a good
discussion of this issue.
8-,-
where 0 c;, (0_ ,1,) 1~ t,t:l:f.t- ~~r~~-g~ '(iive,r:s~:<?l) f~cto:r" ui is, 'tqe output e:q~lva:l:ent
to the "pla:n~ed, acreage a;t, J~!J\~ t, h(.x{! :'U:t :) J$ defined In equatton un, and
f~PL ~tL-~~,:a.~ defined'ln_flJ. W~, consider ui the J-arm'er':s con.trol variable:
Notice tha~ -r (><:t I, ~t-L c~n:siq~:te_~ as;~ -func't,-fon"of tit f has at most two -po'int:s
of discon~lnuity; th~se maY,occur at 0 or ,min {(I - ~)Xt' M-). These possible
discontinuities notwithstanding, we can show that r(xt , Ut) Is upper
semi-contlnuous9 since T >_ max {P,' L}.
Let us define the transition ~unction as
t
.8¥,t .... .aa~t- + .,2u
t
_ if u <: tl - :a,~'~t ,t
x t +1
= x









f.£' <'-u ·"t1~t xt t
where xt
+1 is the output equivalent to period t+l"s historical base acreage
a:nd: where' for-»simp-iicity w'e>-have' assumed that t'he 'five'""ye~r ntbvittg aVerage x
t
. th th b d ' th 1 t f 10 Th' ,-- IS e same as e averagease acreage urIng e as our years. IS 1S
the reason~hat 'We u~e the coeffietent . 8 in (4). :This aquat ion ,;5tates that
acreage planted in year t adds to historical base acreage in year t + 1 by a
simple weighted....average formula, This simplification allo'Ws us to maintain
ttIe Markovian st,ructure of, the dynamic program. this transition is Markovian





Fur-thef, let the discount factor be given by ~t with 0 ~ ~ < 1. Let us




); f(x) is upper semi-continuous if it Is upper semi-continuous at each
element in its domain.
10 If a farmer diverts e~actly the required acreage, then her historical base
does not diminish; however, if she wishes to decrease her historical base, we
asSume that the required acreage diversion is part of her considered
plantings.
9'p:eno:t:e, :t:he set':O;f ·state:g ,~y X)' "-:~:nd le:t' ',:u~i>'d(H"frie' '<U'i~, s~-t i:J:f eOnfro 1~ by':U: l,t
Now we ~a:n ",:(j:e;{':lne: t:b~: :'(il'scdurited .dynamic -=progr-ain 'of thefji.:r-me:r --as 'a
is a functiori'1[: X ~ U~ -and the expected dlscounted total' return from 1l 1s
to
I (ll) (x) :: Lt:::t{3' t ... ~ t (n")-(x)
w:here ·1 rtt) is the expe9:ted value of f:-olfowin~,the p01icy 1t whep the state is X'
l'tn) (x)- 'for all tt aitd
policy function does not vary with time; it is in this sense that this is the
solutisn to, a st?tionary dyn:~mic progr~m.
.If. .tp;e,r~. ,i~.?;n. pp,t.~'~~l,,_J);o,li.qy, ',tl)en.. t:h~ .:value .o.f ,the state Xt"~' x.. 1s
given by
(5),
whe.re, ut is chosen according to n- and whe,re xt
-+-! is given by the transition
equ~,t.iOl1 (~J.. Equal,ion' -:(5) has the interpretation that' a fa'tmer' with ba:se'
acreage equivalent to output x
t who follows an optimal plan will have VCX't-)
as the present discounted ,value of the ..subsidy p-rogr-am.
characterizes the optimal policy function implicitly.
We make a further assumption about X and U
Eqti::ltion (5)
11 A mo~e general formulation of a dynamic prQgram allows the set of controls
to depend upon X
t
, but we are not losing any generality to treat U as a fixed
set, perhaps the set of all arable land in the United States.
10'Assumption 2: The state space X and the :contr-ol space U are compact.
Th-t s. assuJnp-t1on 1s JnQ:~cuotlS el?ougb; ,1t s~ys '. tl:at. y 1elds.- Jire Jlo:tl,nfJ·~lie"
that a farmer can have onl~( a. fln~te- ;~a~e ..a~r~,age, and t~at she can plant
only a fin!te plot of land. -We D,lay _-T:lO;w <state
Theorem: There- 1S', a, solutJpn. to the f arm~r t s _dynamlc progre.m. Further , the
value, f,Wl<;:tion is upper $elllt-contlnupus...
Pt'"oof: Sinoe 'r >-max {p. L-L .it is eaSy to check that :r (x
t
' lit) is upper
se;nr~;::7>~ontlnuou~,in; -u:{. -r~~:;- ~tan~i t:i9Il -:fun:c-~<i9J) glyen- .,~,;n equ~t,ion -(-4) fs
continuous In, ut and it is deg~n-erat-e; he_nee, it is trivially continuous in
the sense of the weak convergenc~ of m_~asur,es. Since X an!i U are compa~t and
r{x
t
-, lit) i.s ~Pl?eF se-mi-continuQ-us, ,we·may Cl;pply Maitra's (196-7.l. th~9r~m. 0
It will be lise-f~l- to givf! sQme"characteriza,tion, of tl):e :9ptJmal po~icy
that the, solU,ticm to the farme_r's -progra,m 'entaIls. >It will he' convenient
to define the function
¢ (q) - [or - max {P, L} - 1] [PY/ AY] [qJ + [max {P, L}] [qJ - c (q).
No:te that if x
t is sufficiently large q,(.q) = !:lext,q) - [PY/AY} 1Xt, where
h;(q) is as defined ?l:bQY,e. Since -po-th f (P, q) an~ ~(q) are contlnuQ~~ i.:q. q ..
we may define q-(P) E argmax qe[O,Ml f(P, q) and q·(T} E argmaxqe[O,Mr q'>fq).
If there are several elements in either of these sets, let us consider only
the smallest such element. The-quant,i:t~esq-(P) and q-(T) are the, (s-mallest)
static profit maximal outputs for a farmer with suffici-ently large base
acreage facing price P and subsidy program parameters CT, L, PY, 1). We can
11now state
Proposlt.'ion· <1: '(i) ,If ",h('X't: .' q* (y» < r'(P. q*(P»' for xt
e [q* (TTl(1 - 0) I
Mh lhentt·'{X't) '::; q-{pr for all Xt;
(11) If q.(-~) :s M and h('q·(y)/(l - aL q·(T» > f(P, q-(P»,
then n-(x
t
) =q-(y) for all xt
~ q·{Y)/(l - 0); and
(lii) Assume that M < q-(y) implIes' that M maxImizes cf>(qJ' 'on
[Ot M]. If f(P, q·(P}) < 4>fM). then n-(x
t




Proof:' ,:If h(xt, qW(T)') .-<: fCP, q·:CPJ:) rot 1a:rg,e::Xt , th~n the stati'c pr6fit
maximal ch'o'ice of output is q-. (P) even for fa'nns wtth sufficiently large base
acreage.- This implies that for any state xt ' It-(Xt} :::: qW(PL This proves (i)
Sifi:c:e- -h(q-(T)I(1 - «3L q. CT») > rfP, q·'(P», the static profit, max.imal
output for a participant with sufficiently large base acreage is q. Cr).
Hence" a farmer 'wfth ba:se acreage x
t
2: q"'(T)/(l ..,.. o} ,may p:lant q._(:t} ahd earn
h(q-CT)/(l -- 5). q.(~)} per per:i:od. Since x
t





q·(T}/(l - 0). This implies that the state next period will be such that the
one-period profit maximal choice of acreage will again be possible. This
establi snes (i1).
If M maximizes cP(q) for q e [0, M] and f(P. q*(P)) < ~(M). then
planting M is -one-period profit maxima-l. For x
t
~ MI(1 - c5). we can use the
same argument -as in (i1) above to Show that the one-period cho-ice is tnaxim~l
for the dynamic problem. This shows (iii). 0
Part (1) of Proposition 1 h:as the s-lmple l'nt-erpretatlon that all farmers will
choose to opt out of the subsidy program and produce the quantity at which
market price equals the marginal cost of production if the maximal subsidy
12paymentsar.,e, -s:Uf:flclen:t:ly., lo~. ".,,:N6w: ,:let: t.h~: <:rmlxl:mal suhs.tdy "·'paYment·s ·-,<be
14rg~.: Then :part :(11) of Pro·PQsit:1'dn 1 :state-s/that farmers' wl:th ,Stif.flc:I:~ntly
acreage Is a binding constraint.; if> costs are tncr~Clslng'then the farmer wi11
be bound by this constraint. StilL if she has sufficiently large base
acreage~ plant'ing ,l1,w·i:ll.' maxi.rnize static, ana' dynamiO 'profits.
We'now s~afe'a :second:r:>F(}pos1116n.
Pro:o'f: Let xt
=$ Yt and let u~'t E' ?irgmax r (xt ' -lit) and v·t E argmax r (yt'




+1) ~ r{y v"·) where: u· and t+l' t+l t+l
~. f~j --are _ai)~logou-s to -U~t and v-L But this is:~tFue for eve-ry subsequeIjt






Tbe intuition behind: Proposition 2 ls ·straightfotwar-d. It states that it
never hurts to have a' larger initial· base a'(jreage'. Indeed if a farmer's base
acreage is larger than max {W(! ... 0), q·(T)/(l - O)}. then it is costless to
plant a lower acreage. Moreover next -petiod"s hist:ofic:al -base- wi11 --sti11 -be
In the r-est' of the discussion, we-, shall. assume:: III that ~{q·{T')} > f(P;
q-('P»; and (il) that M < q-(il implies thatM maximizes ¢(q) on [0, MJ.
Again. this states first that maximal allo~able base acreage is large enough
so that it pays a farmer to be in the subsidy progral'll and second that if the
13maxlma.~· t-o pl~nL M·. I:.e-t \:l~.', define. fJ := ·'mtn '{:q-(':or)/ (1 ... : «5), . M/(1 ,...: o)}; '.the
parameter' fJ 1~ ·?lmp+y /the outt;>ut ,.equivalent .of ,'ma><imal base acreage that a
P~f~191p~nt in' _th~· p:I':,ogram w;iI 1·· __malntaln. We can" now further 'de-scribe'the
op~imal policy function and.the implied value function. We state
-1
Proposition 3: If -~t ~. #J', -then Jr- bet) = (.1 - &lll a·nd Vb't) =(1 - /3) h(xt
I
(1 - -5hd. Further t there is an Interv:al' {,a} . pl in·which -n·.fxt } ;: f,1 .... 0)x
t
for~11 xt
E (a, pl; this implies that v-txt ) = (1 - B)-1 'h(Xt , (1 - o)Xt ) for
xt e (a, 1J1.
Pr<;>Q(: If x
t
~ Il, then 1) ~Xt' (1 - o}xt ) ~ f·(p. q-(P». Then Proposition 1
implies th~t x-eXt) ~ (1 - 8)1J. This implies that x
t
+1




) = (1. - ./3.) h(~t,> .,(1.7" o.}J.t).
Now let x
t e (a. III where a is sufficiently close to #1. Let us assume




) = f(P, u
t
) + ~ V(xt
+1)
-1
~ fJ.F1l, .ut ) + f3 (1.- /3') h (11, ('1 - 0 )J.d
-1
:s f(P, q-(P» + {3 (1 ~ {3) h(Il, (1 - o}J.d
wh~r:e ·the first ineqq~.l1ty. fQllows frQm the definilion of the. maximum of the
value function and the second from the maximal flow prof'its .accruing to a





) is an· optimal policy and since the value function 1s not decreasing,
we know that planting u




• (1 - o)Xt ) ~ v.(x
t
). But this implies that
14whlcl1 Js ,clearJy ,c:on~:ra<;l:l:ct~~ -for· xt
:sufficie~~ly__ r~~ar Il ·b~p.attse h(Xl:~ (t....
otXt:) 1-s c:~nt:ln~ou~· ·tn· ~f ,~m~ .p:.' <" ·:r··.1:mPlie;s .~hat; ·t.n ~..--t)e.igh~orho64: of' ':!l,
_f·:(P~ q~;{P}) ~., h,{p.;" ..T( ...·.:8}~l~ Th~;$·co:n:tra~n;e.~lbn :~~-ta::b~J-sp:es t~:~.t. n~ eXt.}' ='.
. . "',, -1
(1 - Q'}Xt~ Then'for Xt'~ ·J~_l' 11), :V(~t) =;. .(J ... ,f3) h(,x
t
, (J ,,;' ~)':<t) froD} tn.a
definit.t-ol}s of the v-al,ue: and profit functions. 0
Tne int~.iti:Q-n bel;1,in4. PrQP9si,iiqn .) :i?, sif.T\p,J-e. '. I t st~tes, .th,at it is. never
opti.mal for a farmer \o:Iith sufficiently large bas.:e acreage to opt out of the
.-subsi·qy p.rogf,am hecatlse__,.:the pres:en<te~ dis_c:0!:lQted ,-valu~ of the g~in;;; .from,
increased ,future base ,acreage do. not offs~t the ·c;~rrent loss in tlo~ p.rofits
owing to opting out of :the s~:bsi.dy program, This implies that the value of
the subsidy program for SUfficiently large farms is the present discounted
value of maintaining their- current base acreages.
We continue our· charact~rizationof the optimal policy with
Propositi:cm 4: Assume· toat. f (P. q.(P)) >.,0. Then ~her-e is ?l an int~rva.l [.0-,
Proof: Let x
t
E ·[0. b), with b suffictently near o. Assume that n-(x
t
) =
(1 - o)xt ' Then since xt = xt +1,
15-:1 - , , v(X
t
) = (1 - 13)- h(x
t




=:' (1 - 13,l [g(Xt , £3. - ~:)Xt: 'T) p. L. PYt A:Y:~ or} ~ e(l - 5)~t)L
But 1i m x -t-O g (xt t (1 - a)xt; T, P t L, PY. AY, l') - c ( (1 - ~)xl) == o. SJnee
l
f(P, q*(P») > 0. this contradicts the optimality of n·. 0
Assume that it is at all profitable to produce the crop under
conditions of ;~pe;rfect- competition; Then' Prt>poslt-16n' It-'s-tates that the the-re
will 'be some' 'states: for which the -r~:rmer- wtll ,fiQct' rt optimal to o:pt out of
g,];ve:s sma.ll farms'no deficiency paytnen-is in'the timit.
We finish the characterization of the optimal policy with the following
observation. Consider, a farmer whose historical base acreage is such that
,1 t is optimal to ,-·opt» out of---the -suos-idy ,pto;gra:tJl:.' If the, ebst -and- value
functions ate differenttable, then this farmer ,will plant an acreage
equiva1'f:mt to the Qut'put tit that '-is greater' than that, the output- at "which the
margi;nal ct)st of- production is equal to market price P. This' follows from
the fact that the first order condition for the maximization of (5) is given
by
(6 )
where we have assumed that ut > x




. Since V' (x
t
+1) ~ 0 by Proposition 2, we know that Ut
~ q-(P}. the one
period profit maximal output choice when a farmer faces price P. It is in
this sense that the deficiency payments cause even nonparticipants to produce
a quantity that is not economically efficient. Indeed the only situation in
which it is optimal to produce q-(P) is when the farmer discounts the future
16III .. 4 Si~p-le·.An~ly:lical Example
It 1~ > dlfflcult to :provld:e· a, .cl~seO· r'm ~olutlon f~·r: thi;. fafmer~ ~ " .J
optimal policy because of the level of generality with which we are treating
the cost function. In this section. we shall provide an analytical example
of the dynamic effects of ttte d~ficlency p:ayrnents program.
Assume tha.t the cost function is given by
where c is the constant marginal cost of production. In order to keep the
analysis tractable. we shall assume that max {p. L} = P = c. Further, we
,.assume here that PY = AY = 1 and that)' = 0; these assumptions state that the
': program yield is the actua.! yield and that there are no diversiQn payments.
> This" allows :us to concentrate on the" intertemporal effects ·of dericiency,
payments only.
The present value of maintaining the maximal base acreage is
V(Il) .... (1 - (3)-1 (1 - 0) (,; - c) Il
where all the variables are as above. This value 1s posttively related to
the target price, the effective maximal acreage, and the discount factor.
Indeed, the more patient a farmer is, the more valuable a continuing flow of
subsidies is to her. The maximal value is also negatively related to the
diversion factor and the marginal cost of production.
Now consider a farmer whose base acreage x
t is quite low. By foregoing
participation in the program. she must sell her current produce at market
17price P and thus make no profits. ll'eoanse,'costs 'ate 11near~ she' "11'11 /flnd -tt
optimal to produce ut :: 5 Po - 4 xt so that the output equivalent to her base
acreage in the next period is xt +1 = 11· Of courseJ in every '-subsequent
per1-od~ thrs will be her base: acreage as we11.
policy is :
The present value of this
-1 = 13 fl ~ 13) (1 ~ 8) (-r - c) IJ
which ~s simply the present value of haVing xt +1 = 1). i;n the next period.
'Weare interes;ted in the maximal -:-acre-age for which this policy is
optimal. Notice that any participant wit.h base acreage x
t can achieve
simply by maintaining ba'se equivalent to x
t and diverting the requisite
proportion -0 of it; Hence a farmer wLtl opt out of the program in period t
if and only if
-1 -1
(1 - (3) (1 - 0) (T - c)x
t < ~ (1 - (3) (1 - <5) (T - c) 11
which is equivalent to xt < ~ 11·
This result is the crux of the example. Farmers with small base acreage
will opt out of the program for one period in order to build up base acreage
for all future periods. If farmers are identical in every way except for
their initial base acreage. then the farms with small base acreage will opt
Qut of the program and those with large base acreage will be participants in
it. The aggregate effect on the market supply of this crop will depend of
course upon the distribution of initial base acreages.
We can summarize this example by stating that the optimal policy is
18={
5 11. - 4 xt if x
t < f$Jl
'n-'(x ,}
t min {xt • Il} otherwise.
Further. the value function 1s
otherwise.
Notice' that this exarilpl.e: i.llu$frates 'all of 'the features of the solu'tion
that we described in 'the -p~,~vious secti-on. There is an inte:rv-al' hear zero
where it entails no adjustment of base acreage. Further, the value function
is increasing and upper semi-continuous. It is obvious that we could obtain
a closed Torm solution for this example because the assumption of linear cost
entailed that the optimal policy' exhibited a full adjustment to the maximal
b~se acreage in 9ne step. This is not true in general; indeed. the curvature
of the cost function has much to do with the level of adjustment that a
farmer will undertake when she 'increases her base acreage.
be developed more iully in the next s~ction.
IV. Simulation Results for the 'Seven Major Field Crops
This idea wi11
In this section, we simulate the dynamic program for the seven major
field crops in 1987, the only year for which data on the distribution of base
acreage are available. The crops we analyze are barley. corn, cotton. oats,
rice, sorghum. and wheat.
The first step in the simulation procedure involves constructing an
estimate for farmers' cost functions. It is generally recognized that a farm
is a multi-product firm, but introducing several crops into the dynamic
19program would complicate the analysis enormously. It is qUite difficult to
get estimates of single product cost functions in the ->lit~:r:ature, and we were
forced to simulate them ourselves. We allowed the cost function for a farmer
to be an arbitrary third order polynomial. Hence costs for a farm are given
by
c(q) (7)
wh~ch has ~:h~ a~vat1tag~ that it ls _ fl¢~:!:t?le enoug:~ to a.l)olil ,for parabolic
< 12 marginal co_st>s.
-We us:e~ > aggregate data from the Departme~t of Agri~u-ltur'e to simulate
these costs for each of the seven crops. These data are summarized in Table
1 and Table 2.
Place Table 1 her-e.
Place T~ble 2 here.
We have to simulate the four parameters of equation (7) for each of the seven
crops. The data in Tables 1 and 2 alJow llS to compute average output per
farm. From this. we can immediately recover fixed cost per farm; it is still
necessary to determine the valu~s (Xt' (X2'
following three relations
and ex. •
-3 We did this using the
2
AVe = 0:. + (X q + tX
3Qo
1 ~. 0
2 P = l) (« + 2et: q + 6a: q )
1 2 0 3 0
(8. 1 )
(8.2)
12 Since we are using a smooth cost function. we are assuming implicitly that
the farmer faces no acreage limitation over the relevant ranges of planting.




where..AVe is th~ report¢d ~v~rage v~r-1al?,le co~t. pe~. f?t'm, qo- l~.. t.h.e obser.ved
average. 9Ut.put per faJ]n,. 11 Js the e~~,?t~.~ ..l ty ..of mark,~t ~upp~y, .~nd.. P Is agqin
_ < <' A " - ~ ~ ~ ~ ,,~ ~ ~ > - > -
t1}e obs~rved mark~t pr.lce.. Th;e first rel~tlo~ship.1.5 $imply. the de.fintt ion
of aV(Jjr!ige .variabl~ cost. ;The $econq. equation us.~,S the obs.~ryeq· ela~ticity
of market supply t9- derive a; re~atloI)~hl~, b~t~~e~. marg~n~).. C9st .and the.
secpnd derivattve 9f .. :ttte .' <?9S:t funct~'pn. Tb~. ~hir:-d r:-e;latiQn. is i.mp.osed
arhitrarlly ·to t; .•~~ jiqwn the ...:aotual·, c~~l fu:ncti.o.o; .!?tl1J., .it ba~ .the"eCQnomtc
<~ A ~, < > ~ ~ A • > < > A < < ~ > > > '" > ~
inte.rJ~r:~t.a.tJon th~t' .th~ m~rg.in:?-1. c"?~t of .~'he. f~r-.~·t ul?it of outpu,t. is near
zer0~ We present;QUI' simuhited .cbs:t .f:llhC.t::~~fl~ in Tabl~.;3....
-- Place Table 3 her.~. --
Even thQugh the.procedure we used tQ simulate thes:e cost functions Wi;l.S ad
hoc. the resulis corresp;Qud roughly to our· intuition abo"ut the l?rqduct iQ~
techniques far" the sev;~n crop~:, In p:articular t cotton a.p:q rice are
characterized by ,high fixee:t. co.s.ts per f?rm, whe.t:'eas the coarse grain .crops
typtcally:have ,r.ela.tivelY· low fi.)C¢o costs.
The. next :step icn the simul?ltioD.s ~,~ to .~~11-e'Gt tbe p~ramet~rs tha~
determine the opti!l1al policy. We pr~s,ent the 'list of the,se paramet~rs in
Ti=lp,le 4.
P,lac;e Table 4 here,. --
We refer the read~r to the Data. App~ndJx for a .full de~criptlon of the data.
and their sources.
We simulated the dynamic program by dividing the state space into five
acre increments. The discount factor that used in all simulations was 1.05-
1
21in .(,·rder to ca:pture the notion that >the :'real interest rate In 19S7 was
r,oughly f 1ve percent per annum. The optimal policies for the seven major
program.
crops are 'pr'esent,~d l:o,::flgs':' l' through' 7'at the end of ili~ 'te}rt. The' 6ptlrna'l
porlc~s a·re graph~" 'to show'; planfi:ng :bey~nd' base ':acieage; any 'fa:rmer that
does plant: str'tctlY' 'l-ess than her 'historlc~'l base Is not' a p~iticlpant' ttl the
Otnerwlse, farmers dlveft at least 'the tequl:Site propottlor( of'
their base a:treages, 'and t'hey' may 'even p:lint"a 'lowe:t a'ere'age in order to
decrease 'their:: :ht's'torlcal'-:ba'se's' quickly.: The ac:tual 6ptltnar:'pO:IH:y is simply
the ' ~llm-::P:{: 'b~Sfi "~ciea~: :a:i1il, ,the: -ttin~t.iOi\g"'-sJJ~~ ,in'::ftte' ·:fii:~~t,e~.
tt ,is':'s:i~ikiitg th~t' tl1:e~:e "op.t{mal" 'pfjiibf:lUric~t-i'6trs "S:hQW 'that' a 'farmer
with ~mail ,b-as:e, ac;r:e~g~ 'I:$ flbf a 'p~:r-tlc:i:p:afit "iIl' ::fh.:e 'cropr'~stt'1ction program.
It has been the popuLar conception that agricultural subsidies in the United
States have been intended fo neIp' the small :t~Bnily farm. But Proposi t ion 2
-ab6ve shoW's t hat these po1i 01es benefi t blg farin's mote than sma11 ones. This
theo-tetical result" is corroborated by Fig. 8. The figure illustrates
that t:h~' av~ra:ge- "ha:Sf? 'acr'~~~e "of' '~artic.i:pants·'wa-s' much" l~rg~r than that' of
non-participants for each n't' 'the'sa s:evencrop~"ln r:9,gt.
In order to'get i1 sense of the' efte·ct that the crop restriction polfcies
had on 'the average farmer's output, w'e caicJlated the pe'r-fectly c-ompet'i tive
outputs corres:pQnd'lng < to' 'tJi~ ma.rk-et J)ri~e~ 'given in Table >4 and the' cost
, 13 functions 'given in table 3. For 'barley, corn, cotton, oats, rice, sorghum;
and wheat, these outputs are given by 40, 35, 60, 12.5, 75, 25, and 50 acres
respectively, where we have rounch~d the nUmbers to the nearest five acre
14 increment to make them comparable with Figs. 1 through 7. Notice that the
far-mers:' partlc-ipa:tirig in' the program ar-e' typically planthlg roughly the
13 We are assuming for simplicity that the price of each of these crops is
fixed by conditions in the world market.
14 It was necessary to use 2.5 acre increments for oats.
22perfectlyoo.mpetitlve acreage. But the farmers wIth low htstorlcal base
~cr:~:ag~,_,are- p:l~n-ting f~r' bf?,yond _ th~:$'e ..levels. ·This Is ~$pe~la:l~y true of
tpos:e.- . :f~r:m~, _~pose' ~s·e: - ac;reage·, .is near ,the -t:hresh-ho:ld :~:-.tf)a·-t ·d.~f'i,'n:es
part-i.<;:·i:pat~on'tn:tn:e ..5tlbs·,Ldy 'pf,9gra~; thl:s 1$ precisely w-hen '~:h~~e· 'farms. find
it, ~9:v-a-ntageous .to expand their bas.e acre,ages. The.se rough: .cal~ulatlons ar.e
a gopd .1ndicatiqn th~t pol-lC;y ,maker's have cbq$~n the d·ive.rslon fa·ctor-s have
so, -that th~ .~~~. ~ff:'ec:t ,of ~h:ese ,:>po-.~Jc~~s:.on ~$gregate '9:utP~J, ':\'$ ..to prodq:c:e
nea~ ~h~ per-(e:c-tly c0J!l:pet:i:~.1-v:e::_ou~-pul- if at~; 'farf!l~ts part~cl~ted. But we
shall·show' b:el-o~, that the, 'r:ent-s~ekln~ .,b~havior -pro f?l-t~:~:rs' ou.tsi-de tl)e
p:r9:g:r'a:~s,:nas >~~pand~d. agg~:eg~t~ 6ut,put S:~D:~:tan:t-i:aJJY for, 'a,l'i" the':-crops but
oat~., A ·Jnb-T.€ ,a~c'~r-i3te "p-~~:td~:~ti~r:t ,of th~e{f:e'c-t~ that, .;t~~S:fl ?,oiib.l;~$''nav:e ,.on
aggregate output depends, ofcQurs,e. upon the dlstripution of historical bas,e
acre-ag~.
,·We. obta.ined· data· on· ·th.is d,i's.t-rib-ution·. -, of farms t-hFOUgh .priy,8·te
corresp<;>ndetlce with the Upi t,ed Sta,tes.. Depat'tm~nt of Agriculture-, Agricul t.~re
:Stabi):~:7;a·tJQn and Conser~at-:ion',Servi~:e, qommodi ty An~l.:y~,is _D~-visJO-n; ,~he
source of these unpublished data' w(t;s ·the 'Commodity·Analysis Divls·i6tl1N.ational
Agri.c~lJural Statistical Se:r:vices datq.l;>ase, .and the data are dated 30
December- 19-88. Using- these data ·and the si-mulated optimal policy functions,..
we calcula,ted predicte~?ggregate output for _e,ach ·c:tQ:p.
calculations in Table 5. It i,s appropriate to comJ?are these predi<;ted
outputs with tpe actual Otltpu-ts -from -Table 2.
pr-ed1ct-ions for the :aggr:-egat-e output.$ .-of .harley, cotton.. oats j • and rice. Tlte
predicti~n' for whe,a:t output is th~' m0s:t i.na<;c\Ira.te, anq this. i~ incorrect by
roughly thirty percent. Considering that we imposed the restr;iction that '.€X
1
= 0 arbitrarily in (8.3). we feel that these predictions are quite credible.
-- Place Table 5 here. --
23the >pred l'ct~d 'per£ect·ly compet,1t l-v>e outputs equa:lly. ' We turn OUT' at-tentlon
now to' 'the '.'summaty 'aata ·em output presentett In the first '=half' or Table 5:" -> It
,00~~uF>~ed tn. ,:~ft~:t:r: "abs~tlce.
'::I':i: ·1-8:;,';:0:[" conf"s:e ·1nter,est:t~g».- to '>analyze ·:·tll~. -effe~l ,that ',' these> crDp
ptugram:s '·are, value functions;» these are p-Fe-cis-ely t,he',:pre·se-n-t ~value of the
producers surplus. We have not reported the value functiDns here in ot"der to
>all' ·f-ar-me-r-s f-or -a -given crop-' beca-trse we have -the distribution ·of the, 'farms'
It 'is a1\$:o quite> simplEr -to>' 'calculate 'producer
surplus under>perfec-t competitron at the ·ttla:l"K-et 'pric-es g:lven in 'fable 2. the
present value of':-this sur:plus is ·»the di.scounted suin of one period produc.er
surp1u:s in' per-pelulty. > , The· r-e-sultsOl 'tmr calculations'are reported in the
se,cond :'n~lf of'Table 5. ~e s~e that tb-~ exlst~nce of cro:p re-striction
15 programs typically:,'quadruples produce'r surplus. Ind:eed. we ca'lculate that
these c:rop· restrict-ion programs> ra:ises thepr:esent value of 'producer surplus
ror these seven::or-ops, by $232. 1 :b-i:lli-on;~,-this t>epre:sents -a flow transfe:r of
$11'.6 billion per year, slightlY less.-than·O.3% of the United ·Sta-tes· gross
nati>onal produc't.
15 Oats were the exception in 1987; this occurred because their market price
was so high as a result of the recent discovery that oat bran has beneficial
health effects.
24We conclude this section 'with a calcuIl;l:tJOI1' ~f the" P'f9:dvction, de;ap~:elg~t
16 10s's tnat·"tnese programs ,entail. .'We are .in a 'se-cond, pe~t worl,4., )and hence
the 'present» value ,,·:of· ·these stlbsldles may be an ln~vi.table pa~t of ,,.tl;J:e
.pali t,lcal process.
loss to society-' of these programs as a pr_oportl~n of the total economic
transfer ttl· farm~r-s::.. \ole -did: this, by caJ,pulat,lng: the .,incremental costs. net
of the v'alue of, -iIlc:reased output, that the Jndu~e~ ~!\ces~ pr9duqt~~~ for ea~h
'of-·thesecrops:'el1tal1s. W:e-.present: tl1~se data. in T~bl,e ,6. It is·tnt¢restirg
'th~t s:~C:le.t:Y- ~ol{H:i: -save, :$66.- b:il!lon ,in p:r-~:s:e:nt )(.:alue of w:~sted,re-:source:s
simp-1y '·bY.. ~iv~ng these- < farmers, a lutop~-$:um, tr~ltl:~:fet ,,~f, $2.32. 1 bi.l ~ ipll. ~nd tl?~fJ':l
~bori'Sh:in:g a~l t:hes~ programs.
~- Place Table 6 here.
This paper d.evelops the 'first dY1).i3:mic anql,ysls, of the crop restrictton
pro'grams -'of the- United States. The mode1 emphasizes .the fq.-<:,t that the
d:eci~fibn t:o par:tlc-ipate in t-hes.e prognun:s Is vo-luniary,. We solved t,he
that farmers with small base -acreage te~d to opt ~~t of theBe _programs. The
optimal policy for small 'far-mer,s to produce in or~er to build up bR-se
acreag:e~ ,this is 'akin to -rent-seeking ~:h:avior even, by produc~rs w~o are not
currently ·participating in t.he~e progr?-ms... We have showp how acreage
diversloIl., the target price. the loan rate, the difference between actual Pond
program yields. and' diversion payments affects the incentives of both
16 Since we are assuming that output prices are fixed. there is no consumption
deadweight loss.
25part-tcfpants and ;noh-parf.i clp-ailt,s,.
1,/f;f:'have not 'c>tpror-ed,<'tne 'imp'11c~11ons of, 't:h:ls ' m:oqel on the, long-;,run
'dYstilbuti6n of' farm -siies. ~'but 'we have :'snown. ,that sma:!l farms t.~nd ,to
t'ncrea'se their plarit'fngs.: This, may" ,e~plairi : in part'·the _evolutio!,!: 0_f: :t~e
structure of farming in the Un!ted States in,this half century. The faffi.~,ly
farm may"be 'simply too small" to 'take full advantage of the government'" s price
support pr-ograrris.-'" the 'single' most, important' e-mpiri:cal finq:ing, is that,,,the-se
e:r6p' restti cti6n progtam's' result,in" production ,lev.e'ls ,th~t ><;f,"e: typ~caLly ,more
th~:ri. fhlrty'perCe'Ilt h-igner::than 'w'ourd 'ha:ve',,:ueen ·lhe"":c,as:e-.:::i:n, the, ~:b:senq~ of
'th-es'~ :pr'ogTamg~ We': $hnW:¢d 'th~-t the ,p-t:esent ~alu:e,of :,re:so,uJ'qe$ wasted 'in. th~s
rent-se~ki:ng behavior 'was '$6:6''blllion.
It is ironic that our analysis has immediate application for
agricultural policy in centrally planned 'e:C0fiomies. In these economies, it
is typical to 'establish a p'f'oduction, quota for a oollecti ve farm, Any
production beyond the quota results in a reward to the farm. It is obviously
tn the int:e,rest', of " man~g?r-s -of these collective farms t.o ,P{:~<;luce at
relativeiy low levels for several' years in: order to 'keep tt:leir q.uota-s ~:ow. If
a farm does ex6eed 'its quota. 1t is also in its long7'run interest not to
'exce'~d' 'the quota "by too much; El' successful, year only me~ns that t.he
colrectlv~ farm' wJ.il llkely be:purtished' for "not 'meeting its f4-~ur~ "quo~a.
This has been commonly called- the </1ratchet effect/
1
_; S~e" for example, J(?~~son
and I3rooks (1983). The dynamic inefficiencies that these pollqies entail a:re
quife 'sImilar to'those' 'of 'pol-ioy of" the United -States. The ~urrent
ihit'iatives in the Soviet tJnion"t6 reform this poli:cy have m:et, with p-o~itical
oppbsitlon, Just as has any pr'oposed cltange to the :price, ,support p-rog.ral!l~, in
the Uhite-a State's. An alfalfa farmer is an alfalfa fa~rmer. no matter where
she 1ives.
26The data on co:stsofp:r:o~uctiC?nare: ,r.e:ported ,In ,HcEiroyj' ,All .. ' Dl~muke~,
and Clauson. Fixed costs are based upon the gross va'tue of 'a crop relative
~o that of.,~ll c,rop~ grQ·wn Qn ,:~,.,fa·r:,m. Jhe ,natloQ:~l .~~erage is obtained "by
taleJiig "a w~tght¢d aver~ge "Qt, "t)l~,se .fixed pp~t~. .Th~$~'.:~\Jthor$ use 'aslm1.1ar
't~'~~lgue l~: ~;aYs'ulatfng "~ggr.~~a'~e, iiat,a,:?n y~:~iabi:e: :costs:' . " .
The data we rep~rt on 'the number' of fa~ms in th;e' Un!ted States refer to
farm-~ that ha.ve, .qase :a'~.reag~ o( ,the ,crop l,n questJ:Qn in 1987.,., These ,farms
spay .or; ,may not :b~', P~t"tJci-pa.n:ts "hi..the'.r,elevatit .pr:<?gt,arns in ,that -year. the
source)s"<:,:s lri~~cate~ in.t~e',t'ext..' >, ,
The data we report for total output of the,se crops 1s obtained from the
Unit~d S:t;.at.e:~ D.~~par,tJn~nt, ;of .Agr,tC:!lltur-e~s, 'Economic ;Rese~r~h·, SefvlGe'"s
,S.i.t.u,ii~lon"~iid' "O!lt.~qQk .lt~}jqr:t.'f;pr',),Jhcat (A~-gqs:t', 198;~)".,,<sitl,l4-t.lQ~,4(ld .·Qu.t.loqk
Rep'~rt :for Fe¢eI' tA-~gu$t 1(j$:g:) t 'Sip:~;u~tlqn.and' Outlo,(~k"'/f.¢per.t' ior"Jh ce :(Aprl1
19S9:) ~ atrd Sl'fu.a~Jo.tl a~, 'OUt~o.Qk, }~¢;pb,r.~ (¢'t: Woo~ .~~" :(jp:t 'tQrl ,«M~y 19$9) ~ Tl;le
yfe1d per at:te', ,terei~ to' ':pl~n;te.~' ~'c;re:~': 'and theise data ":a:t'e ag~ln from
Mot:lrpy: Ali, J?t$!fi~k~~.,, ..~nd ~,la~l'~Q~." >
, ,
Mar-ket ptlce,s, tin·.g~·t price,s,. and .loan r.at~;$" are from the '-s1 i:uation and
OutlQOK».R~pQrt.$, for .,th~ .releyapt .~ro;p.s. .J·tt8 diversiofl. requLr:eroents are
calculated ~s·:,the''ra'tio of' ;a-cres diverteq, to, total pa.se 'acre;age" for each of
the crops. Acres diverted include those in programs involving Uacreage
r~d4cti.on", "paid land diversion" I ,1Ip,ayment in k,i,nd
tl
• 110/92 11
J, and ItSO/92 11 .
The acres placed into' the· long.,-,term cQ,nse.r.v.~tiQri, ,re,Sf;rv,e ,p-r;0gr.-am ar,e, ~9t
included in acres diverted. For all crops but cotton. the source for the
data on aCTes diverted and base,. acreages is the' United States Departm~nt of
Agrlcl,ll tur~' s Agricultqral Stabi1iz'aiion Conservation S~rvice~ Commodity
,AJj~.iYsrs .D)yiiJQn.,rhe~e d~ta 'arenQJ' ':PUb.l.i'~b~:9c:.. The, d~ta,'for,·..barley. corn,
qat:s, . cind' s~tghUlll are' dat~tf Juty· .1,~S9, ',the (lata for \otheat is dal~ci 10-· May
19:$9', and .the' data for rice' is dated October 1989. The corresponding data
abO\!4 ac~eage,d.iverted f9,r, up~and cotton is from the United State,s D~partme~t
of AgrJ,cul,t\:iret 5 puQ.li~ali-~~ News. (.i;a:ted 10 March ·1988~ and the d~t<?- on
cqttqn,.base acreage are (ouI)cl in Stult?, .Glade. Sanfor-d, and Mey~r on pages
11 and 79. .
,T4e .pr6gt,am yi.f:!lds are, in units:>, per ;acre, .pl~nt.ed. The diver~~o:n
payments per unit not ·planted are calculated as the t'-atJo of total diversioh
payrnents to this product: tbtal acres diverted multiplied by program yields.
For all t.he crops ~~~ept pot,ton, the source~ :for. t~ese: ciata are the same as
those for ac.res .d~ve.r.ted as Qescribed in the ,par~raph abQve. The data. for
cotton are found III Stult.s.• , Glade~.'SanfQrdt .and ~ie,y;er: .on p~ge 1~~ "
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29T~b{~' 1: Data.' Used in Sfmulatltig:the':¢9:st 'r~ctl,~~s
(19S7 Dollars per Acre, Except for: the NUmbe:r of 'Farms)
Fixed C'6sts Yarlable Co'g:ts -Number of Farms
Barley 28.81 48.37 224.900
Corn 56.18 119.90 1,459,600
Cotton17 250.00 99.32 139,800
Oats 39.74 35.00 543.200
RiCe 254.02 57.25 22.980
>Sorghum .~•. 74 Z~.'J7 407.800
',. Wheat 44.56 23.88 1, t 1S.laO
Sources:, The cost data are from McElroy, Ali, Di.smukes, and Claus.on (1989).
The number of farms represent all farms with base acreage in 1987 as defined
by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Comm.odity
Analysis Division on 30 December 1988.
17 Throughout this study we have examined upland cotton only.
30Total Output
(billions)















Notes: The units are all in bushels, except for cotton and rice. In these
cases, it is pounds and cwt, respectively. The elasticities have no units.
Sources: The output data are from various USDA publications; see the Data
Appendix for details. The data on yields per acre are from McElroy, Ali,
Dismukes, and Clauson (1989). The elasticity parameters are from Roningen
and Dixit (1989); we have .imputed the elasticity 0.6 given for lIother coarse
grai:tls~' to 'barleY$ oats, and sorghum.
31« Table,: 3;' :rhe:; 51l1lul,ahid ,Cost'J'Utlct:lons
Fixed a a (X
1 2 3
Barley 1444.4 0 3.36 x 10-4
4.31 X 10-8
Corn 222.2.5 0 9.45
" "':5
2.22 10...8 x 10 ' x
Cotton 7268.2 0' 6.78 x 10-6
1. 26 X 10"11
Oats 436.5 0 6.2,4 x '1'0-4 6. 12 x 10-7
Rice 5906.8 0 4.60
' :-.
6.35 10-8 x 10 x
Sorghum 7'04.2 0 3.00 x 10"" 7.70 x 10-8
"
Yhe;at l4Z2-.3 0 5.80
""'·4 1.0-3 10....7
x 1-0 x
Note: Calcu~at.ed as described in the text.
32tabi~(4: ''the'" pa:'ra>met~'t· s<:in>" '19'87:-/"
,,~> : ~~.
~ ~ " ~A > >, ~ < ~
Market Target Loan Diversion Diversion Program
Price Prl9:~ Rate Factor P~yments Yield
Barley $1.81 $2.60 $1.49 0.274 $0'.22 49.0
Corn <~U. 94 $3.03 $1.82 0.3.14 SO.f)9 105.0
Cotton $0.64 $0.79 $0.52 0.296 so. 00 593.0
Oats $1.56 $1.60 $0.94 0.209 $0.20 50.0
Rice $6.95 $11.66 $6.84 0.392 $0.00 49. 1
$c;>rghum $1.56 $2.. 8:8 '$:1. 7-4 0.27$ $Q. sa:' 6.0.0
Wheat. ' $2.57 '$4.38 $2.2-8 0.3'12 $0.00 35.'0
N6tes: Prrees are dollars per bushel, pound, or cwt., as''relevant.
payments are in dollars per bushel, pound or cwt., not planted.
yields are in bushels, pounds, or cwt. per acre, as relevant.
Sources: See the Data Appendix for a full description.
33
Diversion
ProgramTabie 5: Pr'ec;H:e;ted < Agg'I;,~g~te', cm-t:pu~s '~n~" f:'redlcted

































Notes: Output for cotton is "in pounds and that for rice i.s in cwt.
Predicted total output is typically larger than the actual output as
presented in Table 2. Producer surplus is in present value dollars.
34Table 6: The Social Cost of the ~rop Restriction Programs
Annual Deadweight Production Loss
(hi1i ion 1987 dollars) ,
Deadweight Loss as a
Percentage of In~:re:ased
Farmer Surplus





Ri~e': '0. 1 28%
" <-
Sorghum o. 1 12%
Wh~at 1.2 40%
Note: The first column is the incremental production costs owing to the crop
't~striction,programs: he't ,of, the incre:ased valueQf farm outp-ut, both measured
,;in annual rates. The secon~ column is the present value of the first column
'of this table as a percenfage~< of the difference between the fourth and third
columns of Table 5.
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